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SCIENCE , HUMANITY, AND ATROCITY: 
A LAWYE RLY EXAMINATION 
Steven D. Smith* 
THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY. 
By Joseph Vining. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 2004. Pp. 
ix, 198. $25. 
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Just over half a century ago, researchers in occupied Manchuria con­
ducted experiments on "logs": this was their term for the human beings on 
whom they were experimenting. The term arose, possibly, from research on 
frostbite. "[T]hose seized for medical experiments," a later report explained, 
were taken outside in freezing weather and left with exposed arms, peri­
odically drenched with water, until a guard decided that frostbite had set 
in .... [T]his was determined after the "frozen arms, when struck with a 
short stick, emitted a sound resembling that which a board gives when it is 
struck."' 
In one experiment, the "log" was a three-day-old baby. The researchers 
reported on how they overcame one obstacle in this case: "Usually a hand of 
a three-day-old infant is clenched into a fist . . .  but by sticking the needle in 
[the baby's finger], the middle finger could be kept straight to make the ex­
periment easier."2 
Joseph Vining's3 reflection on (as the subtitle indicates) the claims of 
science and humanity begins with a terse but disturbing recitation of these 
and similar scientific experiments conducted on human beings during the 
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1976, Brigham 
Young; J.D. 1979, Yale. -Ed. I thank Chris Eberle, David McGowan, Michael Perry, Sai P rakash, 
Merina Smith, and George Wright for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
I. P. 6 (quoting Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A l ,  reporting on the human experimentation in Manchuria from 1932-
1945) (alterations and omissions in original). 
2. Pp. 6-7, 10 (quoting Kristof, supra note 1) (omission in original). 
3. Harry Burns Hutchins Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
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twentieth century in Manchuria, Nazi Germany, and Pol Pot's Cambodia. 
The incidents are conveyed through quotations, sometimes of the coldly 
clinical prose that the researchers themselves chose as most suitable for their 
purposes. These quotations are juxtaposed against others from an array of 
distinguished scientists and philosophers explaining the naturalistic cosmol­
ogy that, in the view of these thinkers, modern science has given us: it is a 
stark, cold cosmos without inherent meaning, purpose, or value. "The more 
the universe seems comprehensible," Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven 
Weinberg remarks, "the more it also seems pointless."4 
In this pointless universe, "living creatures just are very complicated 
physico-chemical mechanisms," J.J.C. Smart explains.5 And what of our­
selves-of human beings? Another Nobel Prize winner, Franc;ois Jacob, 
instructs us: 
Biology has demonstrated that there is no metaphysical entity hidden be­
hind the word "life." ... From particles to man, there is a whole series of 
integration, of levels, of discontinuities . But there is no breach either in the 
composition of the objects or in the reactions that take place in them; no 
change in "essence."6 
What are we supposed to make of this pairing of descriptions of moral 
enormities with statements of a scientific worldview? Is Vining trying to do 
to science what critics often do to Christianity when they give descriptions 
highlighting, for example, the sexual abuses of clergy or the Inquisition­
thereby condemning a whole movement of life and thought by equating it 
with the abuses that any large-scale enterprise involving human beings will 
occasionally produce? If so, readers might well toss the book aside as a 
cranky manifestation of the "antiscience" that is one of the book's abiding 
concerns. To be sure, scientists sometimes behave unfeelingly, just as other 
humans do. But there is nothing intrinsic to the scientific method or world­
view that leads to the atrocities of Manchuria or Nazi Germany: that much is 
obvious. 
Or is it? The question runs through Vining's multifaceted meditation, 
and the answers that gradually, tentatively emerge are complicated, provoca­
tive, and counter to the culture that prevails in much of academia today. In 
that and other respects, The Song Sparrow and the Child is continuous with 
earlier writings7 that have established Vining among the more profoundly 
challenging but also more idiosyncratic and elusive (and as a result, I be­
lieve, underappreciated) legal thinkers in recent decades. 
4. P. 11 (quoting STEVEN WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES: A MODERN Vrnw OF 
THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE 154 (1993). 
5. P. 8 (quoting J.J.C. Smart, Professor Ziff on Robots, in MINDS AND MACHINES 104, 105 
(Alan Ross Anderson ed., 1964). 
6. P. 9 (quoting FRAN�OIS JACOB, Tin: LOGIC OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF HEREDITY and THE 
POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 306 (Betty s. Spillmann trans., 1982). 
7. See JosEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP (1995); JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITA­
TIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986). 
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The elusiveness of Vining's work does not result, as is so often the case, 
from ponderous prose or jargonistic terminology: on the contrary, Vining's 
vocabulary is modest and often poetic, and his prose can be lyrical. It may 
be that readers are simply not accustomed to a legal author whose sensibility 
and message seem more characteristic of a poet than of either a traditional 
doctrinal technician or of a law-and-whatever type. In any case, there is no 
pretending that this book is an easy read. Its difficulty may induce already 
deluged scholars and students to set the book aside in favor of more accessi­
ble and immediately usable material. That would be unfortunate, because 
they would thereby miss hearing one of the voices in the legal academy 
most worth listening to. Consequently, my aspiration in this review will be 
not so much to give a critical evaluation of Vining's claims as to provide a 
sort of reader's guide to this important book. 
One who offers himself as a guide takes on risks, of course. One risk is 
that the would-be guide will be undertaking to help his pupils through ter­
rain that he himself understands only very imperfectly. But that limitation is 
an acknowledged feature of most tours. You do not expect the guide you pay 
to show you highlights of London or the Louvre to know everything about 
the subject: you listen to what the guide has to say and do not embarrass 
him with too many hard questions. A different risk is that someone might 
accept the quick tour as a substitute for encountering the thing itself, in the 
way that undergraduates read the Cliffs Notes for Crime and Punishment 
and never bother to read the actual novel. My own tour of Vining's book will 
be intended, among other things, to indicate how much would be missed by 
prospective readers who adopted that lazy expedient. 
A. Science, Antiscience, and Totalistic Science 
Most conspicuously, this is a book by a lawyer writing about science: 
that is unusual and risky and, some might think, audacious. No one, how­
ever, will doubt the subject's significance. Of the various influences that 
over the last several centuries have shaped and reshaped the way we live and 
think, "science" (whatever it is) is surely among the most important. But has 
science's overall influence, on balance, been healthy-or destructive? The 
question is one that all of us, including lawyers, are entitled to ask. 
Taking passages out of context, reading them carelessly, one might eas­
ily conclude that Vining views science as pernicious, and that he himself is a 
partisan of what he calls "antiscience." And indeed, compared to those sci­
entists and philosophers who denigrate antiscience as nothing more than a 
destructive and irrational menace, 8 Vining is more understanding of and 
sympathetic to this protest. 
Even so, Vining himself cannot plausibly be placed in the camp of anti­
science. On the contrary, he perceives it as "dangerous" (p. 63). And he is 
8. Readers who have not encountered the phenomenon of antiscience or, for that matter, of 
virulent anti-antiscience, might quickly browse through the entries under the "Texas Taliban Alerts" 
category on the web site Leiter Reports. Leiter Reports, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/ 
texas_taliban_alerts/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
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affirming sometimes to the point of extravagance in paying his respects to 
science. Thus, Vining speaks of "the deep necessity of science, the scientist 
in each of us" (p. 13). Much of what is good in modern life we owe to sci­
ence, according to Vining (p. 94). "Science is a gift," he observes, "as music 
is a gift" (p. 27). He elaborates, "science brings gifts, of fascination, of 
beauty, of relief from pain, gifts of unclouded thought, of freedom to love; 
and in fact these gifts and their effects are enjoyed even by those who live in 
a world whose material constitution they deny" (p. 81). 
So if (contrary to casual impression) science is not after all the target of 
Vining's criticism and concern, what is? The book's first paragraph offers 
the answer that is repeated throughout: what Vining finds threatening is not 
science but rather "total claims" made in the name of science, or "total the­
ory," or "total vision." It is the reductionist insistence that there is ultimately 
"nothing but" or "merely" (phrases that Vining finds ominous) the objective 
"systems" and "processes" that scientists study-and hence that the kinds of 
objectivist and impersonal explanations given by science and valuable for 
explaining some things can ultimately explain everything (including the sci­
entists themselves). 
Vining's principal target is thus the sort of worldview endorsed by John 
Searle, who declares that the world "consists entirely of physical particles in 
fields of force, and some of these particles are organized into systems that 
are conscious biological beasts such as ourselves."9 Searle goes on to ex­
plain that "the simple intuitive idea is that systems are collections of the 
particles where the spatio-temporal boundaries of the system are set by 
causal relations . . . .  Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges are . . .  exam­
ples of systems."10 It is this totalistic view, and not science itself, that Vining 
sees not merely as mistaken but as a threat to humanity-and even, para­
doxically perhaps, to science itself (which in Vining's view appears to be the 
sort of healthy golden mean threatened on one side by antiscience and on 
the other by total vision). 
Much of the book is thus devoted to describing and understanding this 
total vision-not only its substance but also its mindset and its tone. The 
affirmative substance of total vision is conveyed in part through quotations 
such as that from Searle given above. The book provides numerous similar 
instances and expressions. In this reductionist view, "the brain is merely a 
meat machine."11 As noted neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux puts it, 
"[t]he brain secretes thought as the liver does bile."12 The same scientist ex­
plains that beliefs-which can be "defined as a specific state of nerve cell 
9. P. 8 (quoting JoHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, at xi-xii 
(1995). 
10. Id. (quoting JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 86-87 (1992)) (omis­
sions in original). 
11. P. 48 (quoting a colleague of Joseph Weizenbaum). 
12. P. 54 (quoting JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX & ALAIN CONNES, CONVERSATIONS ON MIND, 
MATTER, AND MATHEMATICS 154-155 (M.B. DeBevoise ed., trans., 1995). 
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activity"-are comparable to diseases: "they can propagate from one brain 
to another, and spread 'infection' much as viral attacks do."13 
But the nature of total theory is hardly captured by reporting its affirma­
tive claims in propositional form. On the contrary, Vining suggests that total 
theory has the qualities of a "creed" or faith (p. 26)-or an anti-faith14-and 
just as Christian creeds developed largely in response to perceived heresies, 
the character of the naturalistic creed is more clearly manifest in what it 
aggressively denies than in what it affirms. Total theory conspicuously 
leaves some elements out of its account of the world: purpose, spirit, tran­
scendence, divinity (p. 43). But it does not merely omit these elements; it 
belligerently opposes them15 and seeks to root them out with a kind of cen­
sorious zeal.16 Thus, for Nobel Prize-winner Jacques Monod, "Judeo­
Christian religiosity" is not merely false; it (along with, by the way, "scien­
tistic progressism, belief in the 'natural' rights of man, and utilitarian 
pragmatism") is "disgusting."17 Such notions, Monod insists, "afflict[] and 
rend[] the conscience of anyone provided with some element of culture, a 
little intelligence."18 
13. P. 53 (quoting CttANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 227) . Such statements may 
support Vining's observation of a connection between totalistic science and a tone or aesthetic of 
"ugliness." P. 45. But the view can also be presented poetically: 
In the competing vision we have seen, of a world of swirling flux from beginning to end or 
without beginning or end, in which all, including mathematics and the mathematician, be­
comes processes and processes of processes, system dissolving into system, things merely 
happen .... Things merely happen and nothing can be more important than anything else be­
cause it is merely something happening. There is no such thing as catastrophe. The raging fire 
that caught up with the smoke jumpers in Norman MacLean's Young Men and Fire is grass 
burning. Grass burning is just something happening. Flesh burning is no different. The wind 
rises, the fuel changes, the temperature escalates, the spread accelerates, process builds on 
process, the organization of the fire replaces the organization of a tree, of a human body, and 
then the fire is gone. 
P. 109 (footnote omitted). 
14. Seep. 73 (" '[F]aith,' like 'belief,' becomes a negative term."). 
15. See supra note 8. Commenting on Changeux's expression of "amazement " that mathe-
maticians can still sometimes talk of divinity, Vining observes: 
The use of the word "astonish" or "amaze" can be put down as just one of the pejoratives 
sprinkling late-twentieth-century discussion .... Stand back, and look again at the range of 
discussion in the essays, books, and popularizations that appeared in such great numbers in the 
second half of the twentieth century: the reaching to deny spirit-and reference to "theism" as 
a counterdenial of scientific truth-is striking. It is constant and widespread. Anything to the 
contrary "amazes" and "astonishes." Even Newton and Einstein astonish. 
Pp. 72-73. 
16. Although he does not enter into the debates or take sides, Vining does comment on the 
censorious quality of the campaign to exclude creationism or "intelligent design" from the schools: 
"Strange, this struggle over the minds of young children-<me might think that the theory of evolu­
tion, appealing, simple, fertile, fascinating, like a beautiful equation in mathematics, could fend for 
itself when presented to curious young minds." P. 28. 
17. P. 50 (quoting JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY: AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN BIOLOGY 171 (Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1971). 
18. Id. (quoting MoNOD, supra note 17, at 171). 
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Pondering such denunciations, Vining wonders whether what is called 
" 'science' . . .  is molded by and is inseparable from the enemy it constructs 
to hate" (p. 75). And he detects in "late twentieth-century cosmological 
speculation . . . the psychology of the adolescent who doesn't understand, 
and who destroys . . .  " (pp. 76-77). 
With totalistic science, as with other creeds, heresy and error are always 
cropping up not only among the unenlightened but within the congregation 
of the (anti-)faithful as well, and they must above all be weeded out from 
that field. Thus, with a sort of monastic severity, Changeux exhorts mathe­
matician Alain Coones that "[t]he materialist program" involves "an act of 
self-discipline" through which even the scientifically converted must 
"eliminate" within themselves "all remaining traces of transcendence."19 
And as if to allay suspicions of heretical tendencies, Coones concurs: "I 
grant that the brain . . . has nothing of the divine about it, that it owes noth­
ing to transcendence whatsoever."20 Philosopher Daniel Dennett pronounces 
that if progress is to be made in artificial intelligence, "we have to give up 
our awe of living things" (p. 48). And with sadness, Vining describes one of 
his favorite science authors, Lewis Thomas ("He was a wonderful man and I 
keep his books on a special shelf' (p. 23)), who in Vining's view struggled 
to conform his gift for seeing beauty and meaning in the world to the de­
mands of the hardened worldview of totalistic science. Hence the wonderful, 
but sometimes troubled, quality of Thomas's writings-tossing out then 
hastily disowning insights and intuitions and hypotheses that "[m]y scientist 
friends will not be liking,"21 alluding to the irrepressible likelihood of some­
thing in the universe that transcends material processes but then passing off 
such allusions as mere playfulness or jokes-"jokes being the freedom of 
the oppressed," as Vining says (p. 31). 
Central to Vining's discussion is a distinction between science itself and 
totalistic science. But is this distinction an illusory one? Or do the assump­
tions on which science is conducted necessarily commit its devotees to 
making totalistic claims? Vining thinks not. "There are great scientists," he 
reminds us, "from Newton to Einstein who are not troubled by divinity, nor 
driven by a desire to eliminate it from the thought and speech of all" (p. 27). 
But perhaps these luminaries merely lacked the sorts of little minds that 
could be bothered by the hobgoblin of consistency?22 Vining's perception is 
that over the course of the twentieth century, totalistic claims from scientists 
and science-admiring philosophers seem to have grown more insistent and 
aggressive-and censorious: the assertions quoted earlier from Weinberg, 
Searle, Dennett, and Changeux constitute just part of the evidence. 
19. P. 81 (quoting CHANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 25). 
20. P. 52 (quoting CHANGEUX & CONNES, supra note 12, at 26). 
21. P. 25 (quoting LEWIS THOMAS, THE FRAGILE SPECIES 192 (1992). 
22. CJ RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON 257, 263 (William H. Gilman ed., 1965) (1841) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin 
of little minds . . . .  "). 
May 2006) Science, Humanity, and Atrocity 13 11 
These are thinkers whose scientific or philosophical credentials may be 
intimidating to most of us, so their apparently total confidence in asserting a 
totalistic view carries force. How might such assertions be resisted? Should 
they be resisted? Like Vining, some of us might find the comprehensively 
naturalistic worldview unappealing-so what? Since when did theories get 
accepted or rejected based on whether we find them edifying, or flattering, 
or spiritually uplifting? And one more thing: What qualifications does a 
mere law professor possess to stand up against such formidable authorities? 
B. What Do We Believe, Really? 
Given his dark portrayal of "total theories" and their implications, we 
might expect from Vining a vigorous, head-on assault on such theories. 
What we get instead is a more oblique and measured (and, perhaps, frustrat­
ing) response--0ne constituted by an apparently meandering meditation that 
circles around and around recurring themes. To appreciate this response, we 
need to consider Vining's somewhat unusual understanding of the character 
of believing and, hence, of the function and limits of reasoning. 
Most of us probably think of our beliefs as being immediately transpar­
ent to us. Asked what you believe about something, you can simply look 
inside yourself and then report whatever belief you find there; the belief 
might be false, of course, but your sincere statement that it is your belief (at 
least as of the time of the report) seems unassailable. If you say you believe 
X and someone says, "no, you don't," the objector will seem merely boorish 
and obtuse--0n both an epistemic and etiquette level. 
Vining has a different conception. In his view, a belief is not simply a 
readily observable propositional piece on our cognitive chessboard: it is 
something less on the surface and instead more rooted in the depths of our 
being. Discovering what we believe-what we really, genuinely believe­
involves not a simple introspection and report but rather a more serious and 
searching investigation of . . . well, of what we think we believe, yes, but 
also of how we live, what we desire, what we would and would not be will­
ing to do. It may tum out, upon close examination, that people do not really 
believe some of what they casually thought they believed, and that they do 
believe some of what they thought they did not. 23 To raise that possibility is 
not to insult; rather, "an inquiry into actual belief, asking for candor . . .  is 
according a dignity to the one of whom the demand is made" (p. 27). 
Consistent with this personal and holistic conception of belief, the 
function of reasoning is.not, for Vining, merely to marshal arguments-to 
"move from proposition to proposition" (p. 2}-so as to construct a proof or 
23. Vining states: 
P. 16. 
We may think we believe something here, or do not believe something there, but we do not 
have the last word on what we believe unless we read ourselves as a whole, in the same way 
we read others to determine what it is they are really saying and what it is they actually be­
lieve. 
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demonstration in order to compel someone to accept a proposition different 
than the one she started with. That sort of exercise hardly ever succeeds, and 
it would be quite pointless even if it did succeed, because the underlying 
beliefs might well remain unaffected by the dialectical exercise. No genuine 
assent would result. "Binding you to me by successful moves of my mind 
would lose all that can be hoped for" (p. 2). 
Instead, Vining conceives the function of reasoning and reflection to be 
that of enlisting us in the enterprise of examining our actions, assumptions, 
commitments, and ways of talking in order to determine what we really be­
lieve. This must be a cooperative enterprise24-one that aims to achieve self­
understanding, candor (a virtue on which Vining places great emphasis), and 
genuine assent. We may well change our opinions during the course of the 
enterprise, but the change will typically come not because we are coerced by 
logic into repudiating our previous position, but rather because we become 
able to acknowledge beliefs that at some level we have held all along with­
out being wholly conscious of them, or perhaps without being willing to 
own up to them. 
Vining's book is his attempt to engage in such mutual reflection with re­
spect to science and the claims of total theory-hence its circling, searching 
approach. His project will doubtless succeed with some readers and vex 
others, but it should already be clear why reading a distillation of the reflec­
tion, such as this one, cannot substitute for reading the book itself (or, for 
that matter, why a quick skimming of the book in the way we "read" so 
many books today would be pointless). With this sort of book, it is not just a 
matter of finding out the conclusion, or even of extracting the "argument": 
the journey is essential. So it would be as sensible to say that if you look 
over a synopsis of King Lear you do not need to read the play itself, or that 
(as my wife sometimes proposes to me) you do not need to watch the game 
because you can find out the score in tomorrow's newspaper. 
Vining's conception of the enterprise points to one reason why he thinks 
that lawyers-not just those who are officially licensed by the state but oth­
ers as well, because "[t]here is the lawyer and law in all of us" (p. 1)-have 
a valuable role to play in debates about total claims involving science. That 
is because the question as he conceives it is not so much whether a scientific 
explanation of some particular fact or phenomenon is correct, but whether 
anyone-you, me, the scientists themselves-actually believes in the totalis­
tic worldview that so many modern scientists and other thinkers publicly 
sponsor. It is lawyers, after all, who examine and cross-examine and reex­
amine, and who probe for inauthenticity and suppression of truth. So in 
trying to discern what you and I-and Steven Weinberg, and John Searle­
really believe, we must "[d]o what lawyers do with witnesses' testimony," 
24. "Belief is what attaches words to reality; and it is up to the listener to determine whether 
belief is there, and it is the listener who can help the speaker see whether belief is there." P. 149. 
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treating even the "doctors or scientists or mathematicians [as] witnesses."25 
Do we and they believe, all things considered, that we are "nothing but" or 
"merely" complicated material "systems" and "processes"? We may say we 
believe this, but do we really? 
That is Vining's question. Someone might object that this is not the only 
question, or the most cogent one. It might be, after all, that the reductionist 
worldview is true even if hardly any of us can bring ourselves entirely to 
embrace it--or, for that matter, that this worldview is not true even if many 
of us do sincerely believe it. Shouldn't the question be what the truth is, not 
what we believe? 
Perhaps. But I suppose Vining might reply that we deceive ourselves 
with this distinction. There is no escaping the fact that it is we-we finite, 
fallible, alternately credulous and skeptical human beings-who are posing 
the questions, and we are posing them for ourselves and our purposes. Sepa­
rated from the question of what we believe, the question of what the truth is 
can mean nothing to us. 
So the question posed is whether we-scientists included-really be­
lieve in the totalistic claims that sometimes emanate from scientists. Vining 
adopts a variety of strategies for pursuing that question. 
C. Science as a Human Enterprise 
One strategy is to examine closely the scientific enterprise itself to see 
whether it can be reduced to the sorts of objective, impersonal "systems" and 
"processes" into which it attempts to reduce its own subjects of study. In Vin­
ing's examination, it turns out that science itself is a deeply human and 
personal enterprise. Consequently, and ironically, if the totalistic, person­
reducing claims sometimes asserted by scientists were actually true, and 
were fully accepted, the scientific enterprise would be impossible. 
In conducting this examination, Vining stresses the dependence of sci­
ence on assent. The objective conclusions of a scientific experiment are not 
self-validating and self-executing, as it were: they must win the assent of 
persons--of the community of scientists and, for that matter, of non­
scientists (pp. 85-91). Science is a cooperative enterprise. No single scien­
tist can personally verify or vouch for more than an infinitesimal fraction of 
the sum of scientific knowledge; each must rely on the work and reports of 
others, and in order to do that each scientist must be able to assume that 
other scientists are working in good faith (pp. 93-101). These qualities­
"assent" and "good faith"-are irreducibly personal in nature. 
What is the significance of these observations? In some respects they re­
semble a familiar argument made by, among others, C.S. Lewis in a famous 
debate with the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. Lewis argued in essence 
that a comprehensively naturalistic worldview cancels itself out because if 
25. Pp. 16, 17. "Everyone moving to a position on what he or she believes in is something of 
the position of a lawyer. Everyone is attending to testimony: to her own testimony to h erself . . .  and 
to the testimony of others." P. 17. 
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that worldview were correct, it would follow that all of our beliefs­
including our belief in a naturalistic worldview-are the product of nonra­
tional natural causes, such as chemical processes in the brain. But there is 
no epistemic efficacy in chemical processes, and we put no stock in beliefs 
determined by natural causes. So if you believe in the naturalistic world­
view, the logic of your own belief should cause you to abandon this belief: 
naturalism thus "cuts its own throat."26 Lewis thought this criticism was 
compelling; Anscombe did not. 27 At the very least, Lewis's argument points 
to a paradoxical quality in comprehensive naturalism--one that manifests 
itself in debates not only about epistemology but about free will as well.28 
Vining's reflections resemble Lewis's argument insofar as Vining sug­
gests that if the claims of totalistic science were true, science itself would be 
subverted. In this sense, total theory may appear to be self-cancelling. But it 
seems that Vining's point is not the rationalist one that totalistic science has 
somehow been refated by a demonstration of inconsistency. That conclusion 
might or might not be justified, but even if it is, what would be gained by 
the demonstration? The confirmed naturalist might respond, "Okay, you've 
identified a difficulty in my argument-a sort of paradox. I commend you 
for your cleverness. But you haven't shown--or even purported to show­
that the naturalist position is false. Nor have you said anything that compels 
me to abandon my belief in naturalism. And in fact, I still believe it." 
It is precisely at this point, I think, that Vining's reflections become rele­
vant. His goal is not so much to demonstrate that totalistic science is self­
refuting on a merely analytical level, but rather to show that even the scien­
tists who make totalistic claims themselves do not and cannot fully believe 
in those claims. So in response to the defiant assertion "I still believe it," 
Vining's message seems to be: "No, actually you don't. You believe in sci­
ence and the natural world, of course. But if you reflect candidly on your 
actions and commitments as a whole, even including your commitments to 
science, you will see that you do not and never did believe in reductionist 
naturalism-not as the whole story." 
26. See, e.g., C.S. Lewis, Religion Without Dogma?, in Goo IN THE DOCK: EsSAYS ON THE-
OLOGY AND ETHICS 129, 137 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970) (1946): 
Every particular thought (whether it is a judgment of fact or a judgment of value) is always and 
by all men discounted the moment they believe that it can be explained, without remainder, as 
the result of irrational causes. Whenever you know that what the other man is saying is wholly 
due to his complexes or to a bit of bone pressing on his brain, you cease to attach any impor­
tance of it. But if naturalism were true then all thoughts whatever would be wholly the result of 
irrational causes. Therefore, all thoughts would be equally worthless. Therefore, naturalism is 
worthless. If it is true, then we can know no truths. It cuts its own throat. 
27. See G.E.M. Anscombe, A Reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's Argument that "Naturalism" is Se/f­
Refuting, in 2 METAPHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MtND: THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE 225 (1981). For a synopsis of the debate between Lewis and 
Anscombe, see WALTER HOOPER, c.s. LEWIS: A COMPANION & GUIDE 618-20 (1996). 
28. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, The Dilemma of Determinism, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND 
OTHER EssAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN IMMORTALITY: Two SUPPOSED OBJECTIONS 
TO THE DOCTRINE 145 (1956) (1884). 
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D. Atrocities and the Morality of Scientists 
It is not only reflection on the scientific enterprise and its methods that 
leads Vining to this understanding. He is also led there (and he seeks to lead 
us there) by pondering the significance of the moral atrocities, large and 
small, that were so conspicuous in the last century: in Manchuria, Germany, 
and Cambodia, to mention the most flagrant examples. From start to finish, 
these atrocities loom over the discussion. 
The claim is not exactly that scientific research leads to atrocities (al­
though it can, sometimes), or that scientists are moral monsters (although a 
few are). On the contrary, although he worries about the potentially destruc­
tive consequences of total theory, 29 Vining seems to think that, by and large, 
people who devote themselves to science are admirable, moral beings. In 
their most truly scientific work they are "driven by love and awe" (p. 39), by 
a "passion for truth" (p. 134), and by the "fascination," "beauty," and aspira­
tion to "unclouded thought" and even "freedom to love" that science can 
give us (p. 81). Both their work and their writings about their work reflect 
admirable, and deeply moral, commitments-to each other, to humanity and 
future generations, and to the pursuit of truth. 
But now comes the troubling question: How do the partisans of science 
explain and justify these moral values and commitments? Or more precisely, 
how do they explain and justify them within the framework and on the im­
personal assumptions of totalistic science? This is the central incongruity 
explored throughout the book: the frequent and apparently sincere expres­
sion of moral commitments and aspirations by people who purport to hold a 
worldview within which, in Vining's view, these commitments and aspira­
tions lack justification and indeed come close to being unintelligible. 
Thus, most people (including nearly all scientists) react with moral out­
rage upon learning of the experiments on human beings conducted in 
occupied Manchuria or Nazi Germany. But why? We routinely perform sci­
entific experiments on animals, after all, and although the practice can be 
controversial we do not typically experience the same moral indignation as 
we do in cases of experimentation on humans. Suppose that humans are 
"merely" complex natural "systems," as total theory tells us they are, and 
that there is no difference in "essence" between humans and animals, as 
Nobelist Fran�ois Jacob declares. 30 Suppose we are, in John Gray's phrase, 
"straw dogs." 31 So then why do we draw such a drastic distinction here? 
29. Vining states: 
We know that conventional limits and restraints can change with belief about the ultimate na­
ture of things. The twentieth century has its warning examples, most gruesome where total 
vision has appeared in social and political thought. The connection between what we think 
about the nature of the world, and what we allow ourselves to do, is now widely felt, and, with 
good reason, widely feared. 
Pp. 1-2. 
30. See supra note 6 and surrounding text. 
31. JOHN GRAY, STRAW Doos: THOUGHTS ON HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (2002). Gray's 
book provides an interesting counterpoint to Vining's. There are obvious similarities and parallels: 
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How do we account for our conviction that experimenting on the sparrow is 
so radically different than experimenting on the child? This is the central 
question that Vining presses over and over throughout the book. (Although, 
as we will see, from a different direction he himself doubts the cogency of 
the line between sparrow and child.) 
Nor is it merely our (and the scientists') condemnation of large-scale 
moral enormities that is in tension with the totalistic worldview so fre­
quently professed. In fact, the writings even of scientists who assert 
totalistic claims teem with assertions of value, obligation, caring, and moral 
commitment. These assertions seem to be sincere, Vining suggests, but once 
again, they are hard to place within the naturalistic framework that these 
• b TI wnters purport to em race. 
Once again, we can ask what the significance of these incongruities is. 
Do they show that the partisans of totalistic science are guilty of inconsis­
tency, or of a so-called "performative contradiction"? Perhaps, but this is not 
exactly Vining's charge. Analytical philosophers would likely respond to 
such a charge with a host of conceptual distinctions calculated to dissolve 
(or deflate, or at least obfuscate) the apparent contradiction, while scientists 
themselves-evolutionary psychologists, for example-might respond with 
explanations of how a species might evolve so as to favor, say, the carriers 
of its own genetic materials. But Vining's inquiry is subtly different. The 
question is not whether a satisfactory philosophical defense of the moral 
distinction between the sparrow and the child could be developed (a defense 
that could operate to exonerate from a charge of inconsistency people who 
in fact were never even aware of the defense), nor is it whether our embrace 
of that distinction can be scientifically explained. 
The question, rather, is what our words and actions in this matter tell us 
about what, in fact, we really believe. And Vining thinks that, despite some 
protestations to the contrary, most of us really believe in a realm of value 
that cannot be reduced to the systems and processes of science and that can­
not be adequately accounted for in purely material terms. He thinks that if 
each perceives and probes the tension between the scientific worldview and the moral commitments 
and values so often professed by those who proclaim this worldview. Gray in particular is exercised 
by what he views as the hypocrisy and self-deception of those who purport to embrace both science 
and the values of liberal humanism. But while Vining seeks to save moral commitment and tran­
scendence from the overreachings of science, Gray appears to call for a more candid capitulation. 
32. E.g., pp. 30-38, 112-14. For example, regarding Lewis Thomas's concern that although 
"life" would continue, deforestation or nuclear holocaust might prevent the survival of future crea­
tures "like us," Vining comments: 
Why should we care at all ... ? If we are the random product of a billion years of evolution, 
and the system does not "see fit" (though those would be forbidden words) to bring forth a 
product "like us" in another billion years, what concern is that of ours? The dice roll six, the 
dice roll two. The six does not care whether a two or a six is rolled next. The dice themselves 
do not care. Only if there is some identification with future creatures, creatures after our indi­
vidual death, creatures after the passing of every body that is in material existence at the time 
of our own death, identification, real, through a connection other than near succession in time 
in the products of the processes of the material world, can there be any claim of the distant fu­
ture on our present desires. 
Pp. 32-33. 
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we exert ourselves to reflection and candor, and if we work up the courage 
to speak in good faith, we will acknowledge such beliefs. Although theorists 
may say they believe in a merely naturalistic universe, their genuine beliefs 
are better than their theory-driven professions. 33 John Searle may declare 
that babies and animals are merely complex systems of "physical particles 
in fields of force." 34 "But Searle would stay his hand from vivisecting a hu­
man being or pulling out a dog's nails with pliers and then burning it 
alive . . . .  In staying his hand, he would reveal much" (p. 136). 
E. Openings into "Spirit" 
Vining's examination is not limited, however, to showing tensions be­
tween what we say we believe in some contexts and what we say and do in 
other contexts. In a more direct and affirming vein, he asks us to contem­
plate what he calls "openings": realms of experience through which, if we 
pay close attention, we can sense the reality of something beyond the reduc­
tionistic world of systems and can look into the world of what Vining calls, 
with misgivings, "spirit." 35 
The same openings will not present themselves to everyone. For some, 
music will provide this sort of insight (p. 116). I recall in this respect a for­
mer colleague who by his own account was incapable of religious faith but 
was deeply sensitive to art and music, and who confided to me that he was 
troubled by a naturalistic worldview because he could find no real home in 
it (as opposed to unsatisfying, tone-deaf evolutionary explanations) for Mo­
zart's compositions. The sublimity of Mozart was indisputably real, so if 
evolutionary naturalism could not adequately account for it, then, . . .  well, 
he was not sure what conclusion to draw. 
For other people, language, with its intricacies and subtleties and poetry, 
provides an opening. For still others, land-fields, mountains, forests­
offers a glimpse. Death can be yet another source of insight: "Speak of 
death, stand up and uncover the head in respect for death, and you have 
stepped through the opening, something has come to you through the open­
ing" (pp. 115-16). 
Still another opening, Vining suggests, can be discovered by careful re­
flection on "the large fact of law" (p. 108)-and on our long-standing 
insistence in law on a distinction between the "authoritative" and the "au­
thoritarian." The latter-the exertion of physical power to force others to do 
what one wants-might be rendered intelligible in purely naturalistic terms. 
But real authority, as Vining understands it, is a different and more mysteri­
ous matter: authority is something that we understand not as coercing us, 
exactly, but as having an authentic claim on our attention and respect. What 
33. "I do not think they believe what they seem to say. The scientist or mathematician speak­
ing cosmologically does not cease to be a person speaking, and acting." P. 12. 
34. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
35. "Let us use the word 'spirit' again until talk can go beyond it." P. 1 23. Vining wonders 
whether "life" might be a better term but tentatively decides against it. P p. 143-45. 
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is it that might have such a quality? The question cannot be answered in 
purely naturalistic and impersonal terms. Even so, we search for and believe 
in authority. The fact that we do this, Vining suggests, indicates again a be­
lief in something beyond the naturalistic. 36 
On a more intimate level, perhaps the most pervasive and important 
opening is simply the presence of other people-of human beings. Speaking 
under the constraint of theory, of course, we might assert that humans are 
merely complex systems of particles. But we do not believe this. Or at least 
we do not believe it when we have the "direct experience . . . of seeing a 
person and being seen as a person" (p. 124), or of actually "looking into the 
eyes of others" (pp. 123-24). In those moments we perceive "the extraordi­
nariness of our individuality," so that a "sense of life springs within us" and 
we know that there is more to a person than system and process and parti­
cles in motion (pp. 123-24). 
F. Holding the Line, Hopefully 
When we are being reflective and candid we know these things, Vining 
suggests. But under the pressure of a theory, we may be induced to tell our­
selves otherwise-to reduce persons to objective processes-and we may 
also be induced to act on those inauthentic doctrines. The moral atrocities of 
the twentieth century were grotesque manifestations of this possibility. De­
humanizing racism and slavery are manifestations of the same possibility. 
Horrible as they are, however, these enormities are in a sense still con­
fined: in scientific experimentation and in slavery only particular classes of 
persons are relegated to non-person status. The claims of naturalistic total 
theory, by contrast, would have more catastrophic implications: the person 
would be negated entirely. Vining more than once makes the point that the 
view of persons that is advocated by the proponents of total theory is a sort 
of universalization of the view taken of Jews and blacks in fascist and slave 
regimes: in total theory "[a]ll humanity is the target."37 
His concern is not confined to humanity, however. Though much of the 
discussion works from what he takes to be a common distinction between 
humans and other animals-between the child and the sparrow-Vining 
himself doubts that, viewed as a moral distinction, this line can hold. We 
react with moral outrage-or at least we do if we have not been deformed 
by culture or theory-when we learn of experimentation on humans. Most 
of us may not instinctively react in the same way to experimentation on 
nonhuman animals. But our different attitudes may merely show that we are 
36. Pp. 67-70, 103--08. This particular line of reflection is developed more fully in Vining's 
earlier work. See supra note 7. 
37. Pp. 26-27. Although the nature of the presentation is quite different, the viewpoint here 
and through much of the book is reminiscent of C.S. Lewis's small classic, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 
(1944). The similarities to Lewis are sufficiently strong that it is hard not to see in the book's title­
THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD-an allusion to the Oxford pub known as "The Eagle and the 
Child" or "The Bird and the Baby" in which Lewis regularly met with J.R.R. Tolkien and others to 
read and discuss each others' work. 
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under the same kinds of reflective disabilities with respect to animals from 
which the researchers in Manchuria and Germany suffered with respect to 
humans. Vining suggests that if we look at an animal "eye to eye," if we 
really look and reflect, we will see that the moral divide we often draw be­
tween humans and other animals is unsustainable (p. 143). "The strictest 
'rationalist,' most fastidious in his arguments, who has a dog, who nuzzles it 
and cares for it, and weeps when it dies, may not be a strict rationalist in 
actual beliefs" (p. 17). 
The point is powerfully made, I think, in an incident recounted by Timo-
thy Jackson: 
Walking dully along Temple Street in New Haven, one March day in 1979, 
I awoke from a rationalist's dream. I heard over my right shoulder the 
screeching of tires, then a loud "Thump!" followed by horrific howling. I 
turned to see a beautiful black Labrador retriever staggering along the side 
of the road with blood dripping from its nose and mouth. It was instantly 
clear, to me and the other pedestrians transfixed on the sidewalk, that this 
dog was doomed. Its internal injuries from being hit by the car, which did 
not stop, were so severe that nothing could be done. It was only a matter of 
time ... and time seemed to clot more and more slowly with each high­
pitched "Yelp!" from the beast. It obviously did not know how to die, be­
cause it came up to two of us in front of Timothy Dwight College and 
seemed to look imploringly into our eyes for some sort of explanation. I 
suddenly felt the need to beg pardon. 
Partly inspired by Kant's speculation that animal subjectivity is "less even 
than a dream," I had just two months before written a graduate seminar pa­
per arguing that animals don't feel morally significant pain .... Now, 
confronted by the Lab's agony, I saw how absurdly callous and callow this 
opinion was. I did not go through any elaborate process of reasoning; I 
simply felt for the dying dog so obviously in pain and so needlessly un­
done. As it slumped down in a patch of grass, I was touched by its misery 
and ashamed of myself.38 
Vining's questioning of the line between song sparrow and child does 
not lead him to any particular recommendations for terminating research 
involving experimentation on animals. On the contrary, he acknowledges 
that such research will often be warranted, just as there are situations in 
which human lives must be sacrificed for the benefit of other humans. More 
generally, Vining acknowledges that economics-the "dismal science" of 
making tradeoffs-has its necessary domain. But we will make the tradeoffs 
differently, he suggests, if we acknowledge the moral status of the subjects 
we are sacrificing (pp. 146-48). 
Nor is the point merely that nonhuman animals should be included along 
with humans in the class presumptively entitled to concern and protection. 
That sort of agenda would immediately raise boundary questions. What 
kinds of animals should be included in the class deserving of respect and 
38. TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE PRIORITY OF LovE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND SOCIAL Jus­
TICE, at xii-xiii (2003). 
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concern? Dogs, cats, and dolphins? Snails? Amoeba? Only animals? Vining 
notes the issue but does not dwell on it: he simply says that deciding where 
to draw the line between what is and is not morally valuable-between 
"spirit" and mere particles in motion-requires ongoing reflection (pp. 142-
43). We might draw the line in a variety of places: Vining does not pretend 
to tell us exactly where to draw it. That is not the book's purpose. 
Its central purpose, rather, is ti:> prevent the obliteration of the line itself 
by the claims of total theory in the way that so many theorists and scientists 
allow, at least if we take their statements at face value. Everything is parti­
cles and force fields, process and system. So say the theorists. But Vining's 
reflection is a powerful affirmation that we-and they, the theorists them­
selves-do not really believe this. To assent to this creed would be "a form 
of death, a giving up, a farewell" (p. 20). Conversely, by resisting the claims 
of total theory we can hold onto the hope with which the book ends-for an 
eventual "convergence of scientific and other forms of thought" in which 
"the scientist in all [is] no longer overshadowed by the antiscientist in any" 
(pp. 148-52, 135). 
